State-Imposed Congressional Term Limits: What Would the Framers of the Constitution Say? by Vance, Dwayne A.
BYU Law Review
Volume 1994 | Issue 2 Article 10
5-1-1994
State-Imposed Congressional Term Limits: What
Would the Framers of the Constitution Say?
Dwayne A. Vance
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Election Law Commons, and the Law and Politics Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Brigham Young University Law Review at BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in BYU Law Review by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Dwayne A. Vance, State-Imposed Congressional Term Limits: What Would the Framers of the Constitution Say?, 1994 BYU L. Rev. 429
(1994).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview/vol1994/iss2/10
State-Imposed Congressional Term Limits: What 
Would the Framers of the Constitution Say? 
Justice Holmes observed that government is an experiment. 
The people are the conductors of that endless experiment and 
have the right to tinker with it as they choose, free of unwar- 
ranted interference. 
Justice Steele Hays1 
The debate over congressional term limits dates back t o  
the United States Constitution's abandonment of the rotation 
in office required by the Articles of Confederation.' Rotation in 
office was heavily debated by the Framers of the Constitution, 
but ultimately was di~carded.~ Thomas Jefferson was one of 
the leading advocates of rotation in office and was disappointed 
that it was left out of the Con~titution.~ As a result, the num- 
ber of terms a U.S. Senator or Representative may serve is not 
limited by the Constitution itself. Recently there has been 
widespread public support for some type of congressional term 
l i rni t~ .~ This raises the question of whether the Framers of the 
Constitution would support congressional term limits if they 
were here today. 
Part I1 of this Comment describes the various methods 
that could be used to implement congressional term limits, and 
then reviews the various authorities arguing for and against 
state-imposed congressional term limits. Part I11 examines the 
1. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Hill, No. 93-1240, 1994 WL 72581, a t  *22 (Ark. 
Mar. 7, 1994) (Hays, J., dissenting), petition for cert. filed sub nom. U.S. Term 
Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 62 U.S.L.W. 3642 (Mar. 17, 1994) (No. 93-1456). 
2. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. V (1777); see infra note 81  and accom- 
panying text. 
3. See, e.g., Erik H. Corwin, Recent Development, Limits on Legislative 
Terms: Legal and Policy Implications, 28 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 569, 582-87 (1991). 
4. Martin E. Latz, The Constitutionality of State-Passed Congressional Term 
Limits, 25 AKRON L. REV. 155, 157 (1991). 
5. A 1990 Gallup Poll showed that 73% of Americans favored term limits for 
members of Congress. Corwin, supra note 3, at  570 n.9. Interestingly, a 1993 Gal- 
lup Poll showed that only one in four people approved of the job Congress is doing 
overall, but a solid majority of the people said their own representative deserved 
re-election. Richard Benedetto, Congress Scorned; GOP Scores Points, USA TODAY, 
Nov. 8, 1993, at 5A. 
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Framers' intent concerning term limitations, and the implica- 
tions concerning state-imposed congressional term limits. Part 
IV concludes that state-imposed congressional term limits are 
entirely consistent with the intent of the Framers of the Con- 
stitution. 
11. THE CURRENT DEBATE OVER CONGRESSIONAL TERM LIMITS 
A. Const it utional Amendment Limiting Congressional Terms 
One way to implement congressional term limits would be 
through a constitutional amendment similar to the Twenty- 
Second Amendment, which limits the President to two terms.6 
Congressional term limits were considered, but ultimately 
rejected, when the Twenty-Second Amendment was added to 
the Constitution.' In spite of public support for congressional 
term  limit^,^ Congress is unlikely to propose such an amend- 
ment anytime 
The Constitution also authorizes two-thirds of the states to 
call a Constitutional Convention which could propose a con- 
gressional term-limit amendment.1° The amendment would be 
6. U.S. CONST. amend. XXII, 8 1. 
7. Tiffanie Kovacevich, Comment, Constitutionality of Term Limitations: Can 
States Limit the Terms of Members of Congress?, 23 PAC. L.J. 1677, 1682 (1992). 
8. See supra note 5. Then-President George Bush also expressed his support 
for a constitutional amendment limiting congressional terms. Robert Shogan, Bush 
Gives Impetus to Term Limits, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 13, 1990, a t  A32. 
9. "It is unrealistic to expect two thirds of the members of both houses to 
vote for a proposed amendment limiting their own career prospects." Corwin, supra 
note 3, at 578. In 1991 alone eight different bills were introduced in Congress 
which focused solely on congressional term limits. Kovacevich, supra note 7, at  
1683 & 11.47. "The real problem for the term-limit movement in Congress . . . is 
that the bills are unlikely to move out of the Judiciary Committee--ever." Corwin, 
supra note 3, at  578 n.60 (quoting Susan B. Glasser, Advocates of Congressional 
Term Limits Push for Votes in Ariz., Wash., Ohio, Flu., ROLL CALL, Feb. 14, 1991). 
One of the reasons for this is that Jack Brooks, Chairman of the House Judiciary 
Committee, was elected to Congress in 1952 and apparently plans on staying there. 
George F. Will, . . . And Across the Nation, WASH. POST, June 24, 1993, at  A19. 
In 1993, a proposed constitutional amendment had only 89 of the necessary 218 
supporters to discharge the bill from the judiciary committee. Kenneth J. Cooper & 
Richard Morin, Time Runs Out on N.J. Term Limit Plan, WASH. PO=, July 4, 
1993, a t  A16. 
However, not all congressmen have been hostile to a constitutional amendment. 
Congressman Bill Gradison stated: "We have to decide if we really trust the peo- 
ple. If we do, the Congress will eventually submit a constitutional amendment for 
congressional term limitations to the states with or without recommendation-and 
then abide by the results." George F. Will, Term Limits: Let the States Decide, 
WASH. POST, Nov. 26, 1992, at  A29. 
10. U.S. CONST. art. V. 
CONGRESSIONAL TERM LIMITS 
valid upon the ratification of three-fourths of the states;" 
however, this has never been done successfully.12 
B. State-Imposed Congressional Term Limits 
In light of the lack of congressional term limits in the Con- 
stitution, and Congress' apparent unwillingness to propose 
such an amendment, some states have taken it upon them- 
selves to impose term limits on the U.S. Senators and Repre- 
sentatives from their respective states.13 Colorado was the 
first to adopt state-imposed congressional term limits in 
1990,14 and in 1992 all fourteen states voting on state-im- 
posed congressional term limits passed initiatives imposing 
such limits.'' In 1994, at least five of the eight remaining 
states using the initiative process are likely to have initiatives 
on congressional term limits on their ballots? Only once, in 
Washington, has an initiative on this issue failed in a state- 
wide vote; yet, Washington passed it the following year.17 
11. Id. 
12. Corwin, supra note 3, at 578. Nevertheless, the state legislatures of Utah 
and South Dakota have passed "resolutions calling for the convocation of a consti- 
tutional convention to adopt a congressional term-limit amendment." Id. at 570 & 
n.13. 
13. ARIZ. CONST. art. VII, § 18; ARK. CONST. OF 1874 amend. LXXIII, 8 3; 
COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, 8 9a; FLA. CONST. art. VI, § 4903); MICH. CONST. art. 11, 
$ lo; NO. CONST. art. 111, 5 45(a); MONT. CONST. art. IV, 8; NEB. CONST. art. 
XV, 8 20; OHIO CONST. art. VI, 8; OR. CONST. art. 11, 8 20; S.D. CONST. art. 111, 
$ 32; CAL. ELEC. CODE 25003(a) (West Supp. 1994); N.D. CENT. CODE $ 16.1-01- 
13.1 (Supp. 1993); WASH. REV. CODE § 29.68.015 to .016 (Supp. 1994); WYO. STAT. 
5 22-5-104 (Supp. 1993). 
14. Jeffrey L. Sedgwick, The Legal Parameters of Term Limitations for United 
States Congressmen and Senators, NAT'L LEGAL CENTER WHITE PAPER, No. 3, Apr. 
1993, at  2. 
15. Id.; accord Robert Reinhold, Move to Limit Terms Gathers Steam After 
Winning in 14 States, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 1992, at  B8 (reporting the voting per- 
centages in each of the fourteen states that voted on term limitations); George F. 
Will, What Voters Did for the System, WASH. POST, Nov. 12, 1992, at A21 (report- 
ing that term limits received more votes in 14 states than Perot did in 50 states 
a i d  that 83% of House incumbents ran essentially unopposed). 
16. Debbie Howlett, An "Anti* Electorate Tries to Regain Control, USA TODAY, 
Oct. 26, 1993, at  5A. 
17. Id. The first time that the initiative was on the ballot in Washington, 
"House Speaker Tom Foley actively campaigned against the measure as being too 
draconian," and the initiative failed. Id. The following year, Foley spent more time 
campaigning for re-election, and less time campaigning against the initiative, and 
the initiative passed. Id. 
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C. The Debate over State-Imposed Congressional Term Limits 
Although the constitutionality of these state-imposed con- 
gressional term limits has been questioned, the U.S. Supreme 
Court has not yet decided a case challenging them. However, 
the Speaker of the House, Tom Foley, who was elected to  Con- 
gress in 1964, has already filed a lawsuit in federal district 
court against the people of Washington challenging the consti- 
tutionality of Washington's term limits.'' In February 1994, 
that court ruled that the Washington term limits are unconsti- 
tutional.lg Additionally, in March 1994, the Arkansas Su- 
preme Court ruled, five to  two, that Arkansas' term limits are 
unconstit~tional.~~ Both the Washington and Arkansas cases 
are expected to be appealed to  the U.S. Supreme C~ur t .~ '  The 
Washington case has been appealed to the Ninth Circuit, and 
in the Arkansas case a petition for certiorari was filed with the 
U.S. Supreme Court on March 17, 1994.22 In the meantime, 
commentators are already debating the constitutionality, and 
overall desirability, of state-imposed congressional term limits.23 
18. See Debbie Howlett, Speaker Foley Challenges Home-State Term Limit, 
USA TODAY, June 8, 1993, a t  8A, Will, . . . And Across the Nation, supra note 9, 
a t  A19. 
19. Thorsted v. Gregoire, 841 F. Supp. 1068, 1084-85 (W.D. Wash. 1994). 
20. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Hill, No. 93-1240, 1994 WL 72581, a t  *8 (Ark. 
Mar. 7, 1994), petition for cert. filed sub nom. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 
62 U.S.L.W. 3642 (Mar. 17, 1994) (NO. 93-1456). 
21. Susan B. Glasser, Arkansas Term Limits Case Now Likely to Be First a t  
Supreme Court, ROLL CALL, Mar. 10, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, 
Papers File. 
22. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 62 U.S.L.W. 3642 (Mar. 17, 1994) 
(NO. 93-1456). 
23. See Linda Cohen & Matthew Spitzer, Term Limits, 80 GEO. L.J. 477 
(1992) (arguing that term limits change incentives facing legislators, and their 
expected behavior, for the worse); Neil Gorsuch & Michael Guzman, Will the Gen- 
tlemen Please Yield? A Defense of the Constitutionality of State-Imposed Term Limi- 
tations, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 341 (1991) (arguing that term limits which only re- 
quire rotation out of office, rather than a total prohibition on future terms, are 
constitutional); Roderick M. Hills, Jr., A Defense of State Constitutional Limits on 
Federal Congressional Terms, 53 U. PI?T. L. REV. 97 (1991) (arguing that the Con- 
stitution does not deprive state citizens of the power to impose election qualifica- 
tions in addition to those enumerated in Article I of the Constitution); William 
Kristol, Term Limitations: Breaking Up the Iron Triangle, 16 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL9 95 (1993) (arguing that term limits would foster the type of government 
envisioned by the authors of The Federalist Papers); Latz, supra note 4 (analyzing 
the various constitutional challenges that can be made to state-imposed congressio- 
nal term limitations); Nelson W. Polsby, Some Arguments Against Congressional 
Term Limitations, 16 HARV. J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 101 (1993) (arguing that term limits 
are unconstitutional and will weaken Congress and decrease the influence that 
Congress has in the American political system); Stephen J. Safranek, Term Lim- 
CONGRESSIONAL m R M  LIMITS 
This Comment will not focus on many of the issues in- 
volved in the debate over state-imposed congressional term 
limits. The reader is encouraged to turn to the numerous sourc- 
itations: Do the Winds of Change Blow Unconstitutional?, 26 CREIGHTON L. REV. 
321, 323 (1993) (discussing how courts might analyze the constitutionality of term 
limits in light of relevant historical sources and concluding that Colorado term 
limits are constitutional); Sedgwick, supra note 14 (arguing that a state may con- 
stitutionally impose congressional term limits under the Times, Places & Manner 
Clause of the Constitution); Brendan Barnicle, Comment, Congressional Term Lim- 
its: Unconstitutional by Initiative, 67 WASH. L. REV. 415 (1992) (arguing that term 
limits are unconstitutional when enacted through voters' initiatives and that term 
limits are inconsistent with the original intent of the Framers of the Constitution); 
Robert C. DeCarli, Note, The Constitutionality of State-Enacted Term Limits Under 
the Qualifications Clauses, 71 TEX. L. REV. 865 (1993) (arguing that term-limit ini- 
tiatives are permissible additions to the qualifications set forth in Article I of the 
Constitution); Anthony E. Gay, Comment, Congressional Term Limits: Good Govern- 
ment or Minority Vote Dilution?, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 2311 (1993) (arguing that 
term limits would cause a detrimental shift in power from the legislative to the 
executive branch of government, reducing the influence of minorities in national 
politics); Kovacevich, supra note 7 (arguing that a constitutional amendment is the 
only way to limit the terms of congressmen); Joshua Levy, Note, Can They Throw 
the Bums out? The Constitutionality of State-Imposed Congressional Term Limits, 80 
GEO. L.J. 1913 (1992) (arguing that states do not have the power to impose con- 
gressional term limits); Jonathan Mansfield, Note, A Choice Approach to the Consti- 
tutionality of Term Limitation Laws, 78 CORNELL . REV. 966 (1993) (arguing that 
term limits are unconstitutional in light of the Framers' social contract theory be- 
cause the Constitution requires the maximum amount of substantive voter choice 
possible); Julia C. Wommack, Comment, Congressional Reform: Can Term Limita- 
tions Close the Door on Political Careerism?, 24 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1361 (1993) (argu- 
ing that state-imposed term limits containing a "write-in" clause are constitutional 
but that the goals of term limits will best be achieved by alternative methods); 
Corwin, supra note 3 (arguing that term limits are unconstitutional and will not 
accomplish their underlying goals); Are Term Limits Constitutional? The Voters 
Have Spoken. Now the Courts Must Decide, CAL. LAW., Feb. 1993, at 35 (1993) 
(discussion between Joseph Remcho, who is representing the California Legislature 
in efforts to strike down term limits, and Dan Rodriguez, a professor of law at  
Boalt Hall, on the constitutionality of term limits); see also CENTER FOR LEGISLA- 
TIVE STUDIES, NELSON A. ROCKEFELLER INST. OF ~ov?,  LIMITING LEGISLATIVE 
TERMS (Gerald Benjamin & Michael J. Malbin eds., 1992) (giving comprehensive 
coverage of the-history, likely effects, and pros and cons of term limits); GEORGE F. 
WILL, RESTORATION: CONGRESS, TERM LIMITS, AND THE RECOVERY OF DELIBERATIVE 
DEMWRACY (1992) (advocating term limits as necessary political reforms); Thomas 
E. Cronin, Term Limits-A Symptom, Not a Cure, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 1990, § 4, 
a t  11 (arguing that term limits are an illusory quick-fix for a symptom rather than 
a cure for governmental problems); The Inconsistency of Term Limiters, CHI. TRIB., 
Nov. 7, 1992, § 1, at  22 (editorial arguing that term limits eliminate good mem- 
bers of Congress whom the people would happily re-elect if given the chance). 
In November 1993, Judge Malcolm R. Wilkey, who served on the Federal Court 
of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit from 1970 to 1985, gave six lectures on constitu- 
tional reform at  Brigham Young University's J .  Reuben Clark Law School. Among 
the reforms discussed by Judge Wilkey were congressional term limits. Audio re- 
cordings of these lectures are on file at  the J. Reuben Clark Law School. Judge 
Wilkey plans on publishing a book on constitutional reform in the near future. 
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es previously cited for further discussion of those issues. In- 
stead, the remainder of this Comment will focus on the intent 
of the Framers of the Constitution concerning congressional 
term limits. This Comment intentionally passes on a detailed 
discussion of the Washington, Arkansas, and other court cases 
arguably relevant to this issue. Both the Washington and Ar- 
kansas cases summarily treat state-imposed congressional term 
limits as an additional qualification to be a U.S. Senator or 
Representative without sufficiently explaining why or how 
these term limits constitute a q~alification.~~ This type of 
analysis clouds the determination of the Framers' intent con- 
cerning term limits, which the Arkansas case concedes is 
i n c o n c l ~ s i v e ~ ~  and the Washington case blatantly 
mischaracteri~es.~~ The U.S. Supreme Court has yet to rule on 
state-imposed congressional term limits, and this Comment 
proposes that when that determination is finally made, it 
should be firmly grounded in the intent of the Framers. 
A. Rejection of Rotation- in-0 fice Requirement 
The Framers of the Constitution considered, and rejected, 
requiring rotation in office as under the Articles of Confedera- 
t i ~ n . ~ '  However, it does not necessarily follow that the Fram- 
ers would be against any term limits, especially those imposed 
by the individual states. The only conclusion that can be safely 
drawn is that the Framers decided against requiring rotation 
in office on a national scale at that point in time. It is impor- 
tant to examine the nature of politics at the time the Constitu- 
tion was drafted in relation to the nature of politics today. Only 
then can we understand the Framers' intent concerning the 
term limits that have recently been enacted. 
Additionally, the various state-imposed congressional term 
limits do not necessarily resemble the rotation-in-office require- 
24. See Thorsted v. Gregoire, 841 F. Supp. 1068, 1075-83 W.D. Wash. 1994); 
U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Hill, No. 93-1240, 1994 WL 72581, a t  *6 to *8 (Ark. 
Mar. 7, 1994), petition for cert. filed sub nom. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 
62 U.S.L.W. 3642 (Mar. 17, 1994) (No. 93-1456). Although the Washington case 
does address the various methods of analyzing term limits, even its Tenth Amend- 
ment analysis assumes that these term limits are qualifications. See Thorsted, 841 
F. Supp. at 1082-83. 
25. See Hill, 1994 WL 72581, at *6. 
26. See Thorsted, 841 F. Supp. at  1078-79. 
27. See supra notes 2-4 and accompanying text. 
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ment considered by the Framers. In fact, the congressional 
term limits that have been enacted vary from state to state. 
For example, some states only limit an incumbent's access to 
the ballot after a set number of terms, and i t  is theoretically 
possible for an  incumbent to remain in office by winning a 
write-in campaign.28 Other states have come closer to rota- 
tion-in-office requirements by defining the limits in terms of a 
maximum number of years allowed in office over a specified 
period of time," or by only prohibiting consecutive terms?' 
Very few states purport to put an absolute ban on further ser- 
vice as a representative or senator after a set number of terms 
or  year^.^' These are only a few examples of the many intri- 
cate differences between the state-imposed congressional term 
limits. Thus, this Comment only focuses on the ability of the 
individual states to generally impose limits in light of the 
Framers' intent, rather than addressing specific provisions. 
B. Politics and the Framers of the Constitution 
1 .  No career politicians 
When the Constitution was drafted, career politicians were 
virtually unheard of. The Framers of the Constitution did not 
contemplate people making a career of politics; instead, their 
elected officials were amateur politicians from all walks of life, 
some of whom served their country and the people a t  great 
personal sacrifice.32 When George Washington was elected as  
the first President of the United States, he was "reluctant 'in 
the evening of life to exchange a peaceful abode for a n  ocean of 
diffic~lties,"'~~ yet he boldly stepped forward and faithfully 
served his country. 
The Framers of the Constitution engaged in politics during 
a time when "[elvery new election in the States [was] found to 
change one half of the  representative^."^^ The Federalist Pa- 
28. See, e.g., FLA. CONST. art. VI, $ 403). 
29. See, e,g., WYO. STAT. 22-5-104 (Supp. 1993). 
30. See, e.g., COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, $ 9a. 
31. But see, e.g., Mo. CONST. art. 111, $ 45(a). 
32. Malcolm R. Wilkey, Lecture at Brigham Young University's J. Reuben 
Clark Law School (Nov. 11, 1993) (audio recording on file at the J. Reuben Clark 
Law School). 
33. GEORGE BANCROFT, HISTORY OF THE FORMATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF 
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 469 (New York, D. Appleton & Co. 1885). 
34. THE FEDERALIST No. 62, at 389 (Hamilton or Madison) (Henry C. Lodge 
ed., 1902). 
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pers point out that "[flrom this change of men must proceed a 
change of opinions; and from a change of opinions, a change of 
measures."35 The Federalist Papers describe the Senate as "an 
assembly of men called for the most part from pursuits of a 
private nature, continued in appointment for a short time."36 
Additionally, it was thought to be important that men take 
knowledge gained in private life to the legislature: 
No man can be a competent legislator who does not add to an 
upright intention and a sound judgment a certain degree of 
knowledge of the subjects on which he is to legislate. A part 
of this knowledge may be acquired by means of information 
which lie within the compass of men in private life as well as 
public stations.37 
Therefore, the Framers clearly anticipated a good deal of turn- 
over in Congress. Consequently, it is not surprising that the 
Framers would deem rotation in office an unnecessary require- 
ment under those circumstances. 
2. The people as the ultimate source of power and a represen- 
tative government accountable to the people 
The Federalist Papers paint a picture of politics and democ- 
racy as seen through the eyes of the Framers of the Constitu- 
tion. James Madison wrote that "to preserve the spirit and the 
form of popular government" should be "the great object to  
which our inquiries are dire~ted."~~ He noted "that the ulti- 
mate authority . . . resides in the people alone" and that the 
government is "substantially dependent on the great body of 
the citizens of the United States," with the elected officials 
acting as "agents and trustees of the people."39 The Framers 
understood that the government must have the public confi- 
dence? yet politicians may sometimes "forget their obliga- 
35. Id. The Federalist Papers go on to point out that "a continual change 
even of good measures is inconsistent with every rule of prudence and every pros- 
pect of success." Id. However, the Framers noted that a certain extent of turnover 
in Congress is desirable, as opposed to having little or no turnover, in order to 
fuel the infusion of fresh opinions and measures into the national government. 
36. Id. at 388 (emphasis added). 
37. THE FEDERALIST No. 53, at 335 (Hamilton or Madison) (Henry C. Lodge 
ed., 1902). 
38. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 55-56 (James Madison) (Henry C. Lodge ed., 
1902); see Kristol, supra note 23, at 95. 
39. THE FEDERALIST No. 46, at 292 (James Madison) (Henry C. Lodge ed., 
1902). 
40. THE FEDERALIST No. 62, at 390 (Hamilton or Madison) (Henry C. Lodge 
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tions to their constituents, and prove unfaithful to their im- 
portant trust."41 Consequently, it was considered to be impor- 
tant that elected representatives be accountable to the people 
whom they purport to represent. 
Although no term limits were written into the Constitu- 
tion, the Framers acknowledged that term limits are one of the 
most effective ways to "maintain a proper responsibility to the 
pe~ple, '"~ and that "frequent elections7' would instill in the 
elected representative "an habitual recollection of their depen- 
dance on the people."43 The Federalist Papers also noted "that 
the government in general should have a common interest with 
the people, so it is particularly essential that the [legislative] 
branch . . . should have a n  immediate dependence on, and a n  
intimate sympathy with, the people."44 
The Framers recognized a need to strike a balance between 
a representative's dependence on the people and stability in the 
go~ernment.4~ Although accountability requires a period in 
office sufficiently long to accomplish desired objecti~es:~ life- 
time tenure would be "repugnant to the genius[] of Ameri- 
~a ."~ '  Likewise, re-election "as a matter of course" would not 
serve as a check t o  make the elected official accountable? 
In 1776, John Adams noted that "a republic 'is an  empire 
of laws, and not of men.""g He continued: "The principal dif- 
ficulty lies, and the greatest care should be employed, in consti- 
tuting this representative assembly. I t  should be in miniature 
an exact portrait of the people a t  large. It should think, feel, 
ed., 1902). 
41. Id. at 387. 
42. THE FEDERALIST 
ed., 1902). 
43. Id. at  357-58. 
44. THE FEDERALIST 
ed., 1902). 
45. THE FEDERALIST 
1902). 
46. THE FEDERALIST 
Lodge ed., 1902). 
47. Id. at  394-95. 
48. THE FEDERALIST 
ed., 1902). 
No. 57, a t  356 (Hamilton or Madison) (Henry C. Lodge 
No. 52, a t  329 (Hamilton or Madison) (Henry C. Lodge 
No. 37, at 217-18 (James Madison) (Henry C. Lodge ed., 
No. 63, at 392-93 (Hamilton or Madison) (Henry C. 
No. 53, a t  338 (Hamilton or Madison) (Henry C. Lodge 
49. John Adams, Thoughts on Government: Applicable to the Present State of 
the American Colonies (1776), in MICHAEL KAMMEN, DEPUTYES & LIBERTYES: THE 
ORIGINS OF REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT M COLONIAL AMERICA 199, 200 (1969). 
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reason, and act like them."50 This is what the Framers of the 
Constitution attempted to accomplish. 
3. The people$ ability to 'khoose whom they please to govern 
them" 
Alexander Hamilton stated "that the people should choose 
whom they please to govern them.'"' This is entirely consis- 
tent with the theme of a representative government which is 
accountable to the people (in whom the ultimate source of pow- 
e r  resides). It does not necessarily follow from Hamilton's state- 
ment that  the people have an  absolute right to elect whom they 
please. Exactly what, then, did Hamilton mean by his state- 
ment? 
First of all, it is important to remember that Hamilton's 
ofbquoted statement was made a t  a point in history when 
Senators were chosen by the state legislatures, and not directly 
by the people.52 If the people had an absolute right to elect 
their representatives, why would the Senators be elected by the 
legislative bodies instead of directly by the people as was the 
House of  representative^?^^ Additionally, the Constitution it- 
self requires that members of Congress (and the President) 
satisfy certain specified qualifi~ations;~ making i t  impossible, 
for example, for the people to choose a twenty-year-old person 
to govern over them as President of the United States, no mat- 
ter how strong the public support for such an  individual. Thus, 
Hamilton's statement must be taken in light of the political 
circumstances described above. Hamilton recognized that the 
ultimate source of the government's authority is the people, 
and that  such a representative government should be account- 
able to the people, allowing them to "choose whom they please 
to govern them."55 
50. Id. 
51. 2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOFTION 
OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 257 (Jonathan Elliot ed., reprint ed. 1987) (2d ed. 
1888) [hereinafter DEBATES] (quoting Alexander Hamilton). 
52. U.S. CONST. art. I, $ 3, el. 1, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XVII, $ 1. 
53. See U.S. CONST. art. I, $ 2, el. 1. 
54. See U.S. CONST. art. I, $ 2, el. 2; id. art. I, $ 3, el. 3; id. art. 11, $ 1, cl. 
5 .  
55. 2 DEBATES, supra note 51, at 257. 
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C. The Politics of Today 
The politics of today stand in stark contrast to  that experi- 
enced by the Framers of the Constitution. Consequently, before 
passing judgment on state-imposed congressional term limits, it 
is important to  compare the politics of today to that envisioned 
by the Framers. 
1. Career politicians 
Today we have career politicians who are virtually guaran- 
teed re-election.56 In 1988, "more congressmen left office be- 
cause of death (seven) than were defeated at the polls (six)."57 
Turnover in the House of Representatives is generally less than 
the turnover in the former Soviet pol it bur^.^' No longer do we 
have a continual infusion of fresh opinions and measures into 
the government. No longer do we have men "called for the most 
part from pursuits of a private nature, continued in appoint- 
ment for a short time."g Two prime examples of this are Tom 
Foley, Speaker of the House, and Jack Brooks, Chairman of the 
House Judiciary Committee. Tom Foley was elected to  Con- 
gress in 1964, and Jack Brooks was elected in 1952?' It is 
hard to imagine that either of these Representatives has any- 
thing new to  contribute to  the government of this country. I t  is 
also hard to  believe that the Framers of the Constitution antici- 
pated such perpetual service in Congress when they decided 
not to  include in the Constitution a rotation-in-office re- 
quirement. 
"The aim of every political constitution is, or ought to be, 
first to  obtain for rulers men who possess most wisdom to  dis- 
cern, and most virtue to pursue, the common good of the soci- 
ety. . . .'"I Opponents of such limits claim that term limits 
rob Congress of the most qualified individuals, those with expe- 
rience and knowledge." 
56. In 1992, 83% of House incumbents ran essentially unopposed. Will, supra 
note 15, at A21. 
57. Kristol, supra note 23, at 97. 
58. Ronald D. Rotunda, No Impediment to Term Limits, WASH. POST, Feb. 13, 
1993, at A31. 
59. THE FEDERALIST No. 62, at 388 (Hamilton or Madison) (Henry C. Lodge 
ed., 1902) (emphasis added). 
60. Will, . . . And Across the Nation, supra note 9, at A19. 
61. THE FEDERALIST No. 57, at 356 (Hamilton or Madison) (Henry C. Lodge 
ed., 1902). 
62. See, e.g., Polsby, supra note 23, at 104-05. Alexander Hamilton declared 
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If term limits would result in less capable, less experienced, 
and less responsible people running for Congress, indeed, 
such measures would be undesirable. If, however, one ran- 
domly compares five House members who have been in Con- 
gress less than twelve years with five who have been there 
longer, i t  is unlikely that he will find that the senior repre- 
sentatives possess a greater degree of wisdom, knowledge, 
and technical mastery than their junior  colleague^.^ 
On the contrary, term limits may actually increase the likeli- 
hood of attracting the type of men envisioned by James Madi- 
son, and the other Framers, to the government." 
The current system prevents legislators, especially in the 
House of Representatives, from achieving significant power 
until they have attained seniority. It  discourages people who 
have accomplished something in other walks of life from run- 
ning for Congress. Such individuals are put off by the notion 
that they will have to serve as members of Congress for fif- 
teen or twenty years before they have amassed enough influ- 
ence for their voices to be heard by the others on Capitol 
~ i 1 1 . ~ ~  
T e r n  limits would be an  important step towards breaking 
down these seniority barriers that are discouraging qualified 
people from running for Congress, thereby giving the people 
greater freedom of choice in elections. With more and more 
members of Congress subject to state-imposed term limits, "the 
seniority system will not long endure as a means of allocating 
political power and Federal largess. Term-limited members of 
Congress will have different incentives from career politicians. 
They will work to change the rules of the House and Senate 
under which political power is all~cated."~ This will be a big 
step towards giving the political power back to the people 
where it belongs. 
that the ability to be re-elected "is necessary to enable the people, when they see 
reason to approve of [a representative's] . . . conduct, to continue him in his sta- 
tion, in order to prolong the utility of his talents and virtues, and to secure to the 
government the advantage of permanency in a wise system of administration." THE 
FEDERALIST No. 72, at 451 (Alexander Hamilton) (Henry C. Lodge ed., 1902). 
63. Kristol, supra note 23, at 98-99. 
64. Id. at 98. 
65. Id. 
66. Mark P. Petracca, Term Limits Set Us on the Road to Democracy, N.Y. 
RMES, Nov. 20, 1992, at A30 (letter to the editor written by a professor of political 
science). 
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2. A supposedly representative government which is no longer 
accountable to the people 
The re-election as a matter of course enjoyed by incum- 
bents today has destroyed the accountability of Congress to the 
people. No longer do we have elected officials who retain a 
common interest with the people; indeed, some politicians have 
spent so much time in Washington D.C. that one wonders if 
they remember what their home state is really like. Roger 
Sherman warned that this might happen when he advocated 
annual elections for U.S. Representatives during the Constitu- 
tional Convention. "The representatives ought to return home 
and mix with the people. By remaining at the seat of govern- 
ment, they will acquire the habits of the place, which might 
differ from those of their constituents . . . .'767 
Congress is rapidly losing the public confidence,6' and has 
proven to be unresponsive to its true source of power, the peo- 
ple. Otherwise, Congress would respond to the will of the peo- 
ple and at least submit to the people for ratification a constitu- 
tional amendment limiting terms. Instead, Congress is doing 
the exact opposite and defiantly resisting the people who elect- 
ed them, by opposing the people's attempts to limit congressio- 
nal terms. "Politicians react to term limits as vampires do to 
the A prime example of this is Speaker of the House 
Tom Foley's lawsuit challenging the term limits enacted by his 
~ o n s t i t u e n t s . ~ ~  
Not all members of Congress are unresponsive and unac- 
countable to the people. Senator Malcolm Wallop of Wyoming, 
an  excellent example of an elected representative who recogniz- 
es that the people are the true source of his authority, is will- 
ing to abide by their wishes. Senator Wallop has declared that 
he will not seek a fourth term out of respect for Wyoming 
voters' belief in term limits, even though he could serve two 
67. C O N S ~ I O N A L  CHAFF: REJECTED SUGGESTIONS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
CONVENTION OF 1787, at 7 (Jane Butzner ed., 1970) (quoting Roger Sherman). 
68. "A recent Gallup Poll showed that only 20% of respondents said they be- 
lieve that they can trust the federal government all or some of the time-little 
more than half the percentage during the Watergate scandal in 1974." Robert 
Shogan, Public Discontent for Lawmakers Hits New High; Drastic Reforms Gain 
Favor, LA. TIMES, Mar. 10, 1994 at A5; see also supra note 5 and accompanying 
text. 
69. Robert D. Novak, Term Limits: In Trenton . . ., WASH. POST, June 24, 
1993, at A19. 
70. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text. 
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more terms under Wyoming's recently enacted legi~lation.~' 
Perhaps if more members of Congress were like Senator Wal- 
lop, formal term limitations would be unnecessary. Unfortu- 
nately, that  is not the case. 
3. The people's ability to "choose whom they please to govern 
themn 
One of the main arguments used by opponents of state- 
imposed term limitations is the people's right of choice. They 
invariably quote Alexander Hamilton's statement that  "the 
people should choose whom they please to govern them."72 
What these opponents fail to realize is that the state-imposed 
congressional term limits have been imposed by the voice of the 
people in all fifteen states which currently have such limits.73 
The people have asked for an alternative to incumbents. State- 
imposed congressional term limits implemented by the people 
are merely the result of the people exercising their right to 
choose whom they please to not govern them. Surely the people 
have greater freedom to choose whom they please under state- 
imposed congressional term limits than they did when the state 
legislatures chose the Senators. It is possible that voter apathy 
might be attributable, in part, to the feeling that the incum- 
bent is going to win anyway, so why bother voting. State-im- 
posed term limits will help to dispel that perception and once 
again empower the people to exercise their right of choice. 
D. State-Imposed Congressional Term Limits Would Be 
a Step Toward the Type of Government 
Envisioned by the Framers 
In  short, "the spirit and the form of popular government" 
envisioned by the Framers of the Con~ t i tu t ion~~  no longer ex- 
ists. In  light of today's political exigencies, congressional term 
71. Wyoming Senator Limits His Own Term, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 11, 1993, $ 1, 
at  8. 
72. 2 DEBATES, supra note 51, at 257; see, e.g., Latz, supra note 4, at 171; 
Kovacevich, supra note 7, at  1702; Corwin, supra note 3, at  588. 
73. In 1993, the state legislature of New Jersey almost became the first state 
legislature to impose congressional term limits. See Novak, supra note 69, a t  A19. 
However, the New Jersey Senate failed to even vote on the bill even though the 
State Assembly had already voted in favor of it. Cooper & Morin, supra note 9, a t  
A16. 
74. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at  55-56 (James Madison) (Henry C. Lodge 
ed., 1902). 
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limits, particularly state-imposed term limits enacted by the 
voice of the people-the true source of power, are entirely con- 
sistent with the intent of the Framers of the Constitution. Con- 
gressional term limits "would change the culture of Congress 
and the culture of our politics" for the better.75 
E. Congressional Term Limits Are Necessary to 
Prevent the People from Becoming Sheep 
and the Government the Shepherd 
In the early 1800s, Alexis de Toqueville described the sort 
of despotism that America had to fear as a democratic na- 
t i ~ n . ~ ~  He stated: 
[Americans] are constantly excited by two conflicting pas- 
sions: they want to be led, and they wish to remain free. As 
they cannot destroy either the one or the other of these con- 
trary propensities, they strive to satisfy them both a t  once. 
They devise a sole, tutelary, and all-powerful form of govern- 
ment, but elected by the people." 
Such a government does not necessarily tyrannize the people, 
but it is dangerous just the same. 
The will of man is not shattered, but softened, bent, and guid- 
ed; men are seldom forced by i t  to act, but they are constantly 
restrained from acting. Such a power does not destroy, but i t  
prevents existence; i t  does not tyrannize, but i t  compresses, 
enervates, extinguishes, and stupefies a people, till [they are] 
. . . reduced to nothing better than a flock of timid and indus- 
trious animals, of which the government is the shepherd." 
The ability to elect government officials alone will not prevent 
this type of despotism. "By this system the people shake off 
their state of dependence just long enough to select their mas- 
ter and then relapse into it again."79 Even Thomas Jefferson 
warned, "If [the people] become inattentive to the public affairs, 
. . . Congress and Assemblies, Judges and Governors, shall all 
become wolves."80 
75. Kristol, supra note 23, at 99. 
76. 2 ALEXIS DE TOQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 316-21 (Phillips 
Bradley ed. & Henry Reeve trans., Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. 1972) (1835). 
77. 2 id. at 319. 
78. 2 id. 
79. 2 id. 
80. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Col. Edward Carrington (Jan. 16, 1787), 
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Due to the nature of politics at the time the Constitution 
was drafted, this sort of despotism had little chance of actually 
occurring. Frequent turnover in Congress and accountability to 
the people kept the government in check. However, that is not 
true today. At  the risk of sensationalizing the issue, when vot- 
ers file to the polls and unconsciously re-elect the same mem- 
bers of Congress time after time after time, one has to wonder 
if they are much more than sheep blindly following a shepherd. 
This appears to be contrary to the type of government envi- 
sioned by the Framers. 
F. The Constitutional Framwork and 
Its Intended Application 
The Articles of Confederation mandated that the state 
delegates t o  Congress would rotate on a regular basis by stat- 
ing, "[Nlo person shall be capable of being a delegate for more 
than three years in any term of six years."s1 This rotation-in- 
office requirement was not carried over into the United States 
Constitution. Instead, the Constitution sets forth the number of 
years that U.S. senators and representative serve in a single 
term, but it is silent regarding the number of terms a senator 
or representative may serve. 
1. The Times, Places and Manner Clause v. the Qualifications 
Clauses 
Much of the debate over state-imposed congressional term 
limits has attempted t o  define the issue in terms of either the 
Times, Places and Manner Clause,82 or the Qualifications 
Clausess3 of the Constitution. However, it is not clear that 
quoted in GARREW W. SHELDON, THE POL~ICAL PHILOSOPHY OF THOMAS JEFFER- 
SON 69-70 (1991). 
81. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. V (1777). 
82. "The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and 
Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but 
the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as 
to the Place of chusing [sic] Senators." U.S. CONST. art. I, 5 4, cl. 1. 
83. "No Person shall be a Representative who shall not have attained to the 
Age of twenty five Years, and been seven Years a Citizen of the United States, 
and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State in which he shall 
be chosen." U.S. CONST. art. I, 5 2, cl. 2. 
"No Person shall be a Senator who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty 
Years, and been nine Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, 
when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State for which he shall be chosen." U.S. 
CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 3. 
4291 CONGRESSIONAL TERM LIMITS 445 
state-imposed congressional term limits fit neatly into either 
one of these characterizations. This leaves unanswered the 
question: what was the Framers' intent concerning congressio- 
nal term limits, particularly those that might be imposed by 
the individual states? 
a. The Times, Places and Manner Clause (Manner 
Clause). The Manner Clause gives the individual states the 
power to regulate the "Times, Places and Manner of holding 
Elections for Senators and Representatives," but reserves to  
Congress the power to  alter the state regulations by law.84 
This Clause "met with little discussion in the [Constitutional] 
Conventi~n."~~ However, it was hotly debated during the state 
ratifying  convention^.^^ The states "were disturbed by the 
word 'manner' because they thought it had virtually unlimited 
meaning" and "gave Congress ultimate and unfettered discre- 
tion to  alter elections. No other entity, legislative, executive, or 
judicial, state or federal, could control this dis~retion."~' Pro- 
ponents of the Constitution argued "that the federal govern- 
ment would restrain itself from abusing this power unless the 
federal government's very existence was threatened."88 Alex- 
ander Hamilton argued that the reason Congress was given 
ultimate power in this Clause was "to prevent the dissolution 
of the federal government by the  state^.'"^ Many states called 
for an amendment limiting Congress' power to enact regula- 
tions under the Manner Clause to  "cases where a state shall 
neglect or refuse t o  make the regulations therein mentioned, or 
shall make regulations subversive of the rights of the people to  
a free and equal representation in Congres~."~~ Such an 
amendment was never adopted. 
It appears that the Manner Clause was intended t o  give 
the states broad powers in regulating federal elections, and 
that Congress would only intervene if the states took action 
that threatened the existence of the federal government. It 
would be difficult t o  characterize state-imposed term limita- 
tions as threatening the existence of the federal government. 
However, it is not entirely clear that such limits can properly 
84. U.S. CONST. art. I, 9 4, cl. 1. 
85. Safranek, supra note 23, at 328. 
86. Id. at 329-40. 
87. Id. at 331. 
88. Id. at 334. 
89. Id. at 341. 
90. Id. at 332. 
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be characterized as permissible state regulations of federal 
elections under the Manner Clause. 
b. The Qualifications Clauses. Opponents of state-im- 
posed term limits argue that states are adding a qualification 
to those enumerated in the Constitution-that the candidate 
not have already served for more than a specified number of 
years. They claim that the list of qualifications in the Constitu- 
tion has "been interpreted consistently and correctly by the 
courts as setting maximum requirements that may not be al- 
tered by Congress or the states.'"' Proponents of state-im- 
posed congressional term limits argue that "the discussion of 
the qualifications [at the Constitutional Convention], the word- 
ing of the Qualifications Clause[s], and the structure of the 
Constitution all suggest that the qualifications for senators and 
representatives were meant to ensure that states sent minimal- 
ly qualified candidates to Congre~s."~~ Unlike the Manner 
Clause, the Qualifications Clauses were not the subject of sig- 
nificant debate at the Constitutional C~nvention.'~ "The 
[sparse] debate over the Qualifications Clause[s] in the state 
ratifying debates stands in stark contrast t o  the breadth and 
ferocity of the argument over the [Manner] Clause."94 
"Joseph Story often is considered one of the preeminent 
sources of constitutional interpretation because of his propin- 
quity to the era of ratification and his long tenure on the Su- 
preme Opponents of state-imposed term limits rely 
on the fact that "Story thought that the enumeration of quali- 
fications in the Constitution excluded all other qualifica- 
tions ."96 
It is far from clear that Joseph Story's view of the exclusiv- 
ity of the Qualifications Clauses is the correct one, or that 
state-imposed congressional term limits are even contrary to  
his view. Whether these term limits can even be characterized 
as a "qualification" is more of a debate over semantics than it 
is over constitutional interpretation. Like the Manner Clause 
analysis, the analysis of the Qualifications Clauses seems a bit 
forced. "The lack of any evidence indicating a limitation on the 
91. Corwin, supm note 3, at 579. 
92. Safranek, supra note 23, at 350. 
93. Id. at 350-54. 
94. Id. at 354. 
95. Id. at 344. 
96. Id. at 358. 
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states to add qualifications, at a convention that was called in 
large measure to limit state power, is as determinative as his- 
tory can be."97 
2. The Tenth Amendment 
If state-imposed congressional term limits cannot be prop- 
erly characterized as falling under the Manner Clause or the 
Qualifications Clauses, what is left? The Tenth Amendment is 
a catch-all provision that specifically reserves to the respective 
states any "powers not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States?' If neither 
the Manner Clause, nor the Qualifications Clauses adequately 
address the issue of state-imposed congressional term limits, 
then it may be proper to  analyze it under the Tenth Amend- 
ment. 
Regarding his interpretation of the Qualifications Clauses, 
"[Joseph] Story admitted that no less an authority than Thom- 
as Jefferson had opposed [his] view."gg Jefferson believed "that 
the Tenth Amendment provides the states and the people with 
any power not given explicitly to the federal go~ernment."'~~ 
Jefferson further elaborated this view by stating, "To take a 
single step beyond the boundaries thus specially drawn around 
the powers of Congress is to take possession of a boundless 
field of power, no longer susceptible of any definition."lo1 
Thus, "[tlhe Qualifications Clause[s], being expressed in the 
negative, merely set[] forth minimum qualifications beyond 
which the states are free to add."lo2 This line of reasoning is 
consistent with the form of government described in The Feder- 
alist Papers-one in which the ultimate power and authority 
resides in the people, giving the people control over their elect- 
ed representatives. 
Joseph Story "added that even if one conceded that states 
have the power to add qualifications, state legislatures are not 
the entity capable of exercising this power, only the people of 
97. Id. at 353. 
98. U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
99. Safranek, supra note 23, at 358. 
100. Id. at 358-59. 
101. Thomas Jefferson, Opinion on the Constitutionality of the Bill for Estab- 
lishing a National Bank (Feb. 15, 1791), in JEFFERSON POWELL, LANGUAGES OF 
POWER: A SOURCEBOOK OF EARLY AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 41, 42 
(1991). 
102. Safranek, supra note 23, at 358-59. 
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the state have this power."'03 In all ffiteen states imposing 
congressional term limits, these limits have been enacted by 
the voice of the people declaring their will. "Story admitted 
that his position was not conclusive. Instead, he thought his 
theory shifted the burden of proof to the states to show that 
they have the power to add qualifications beyond those found 
in the Constit~tion."'~~ The presently enacted state-imposed 
congressional term limits have carried this burden of proof. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Constitution should be interpreted as a flexible docu- 
ment capable of adapting to  present day exigencies in light of 
the Framers' intentions. Even the Framers themselves, or at 
least some of them, never imagined that the political structure 
they created would have the longevity it has enjoyed. James 
Madison objected that one member of the House for every forty 
thousand inhabitants would render the House excessive with 
the impending increase in population.'" Nathaniel Gorham 
replied, "The government . . . will not last so long as to produce 
this effect. Can it be supposed that this vast country, including 
the western territory, will one hundred and fiRy years hence 
remain one nation?"lo6 Despite these doubts, the government 
has lasted, but it must adapt to  conform more closely to the 
Framers' vision if it is to  ultimately survive. 
The government must acknowledge that its ultimate source 
of power is the people and once again become accountable to 
the people for its actions. The voice of the people has spoken, 
and the people want congressional term limits. "Term limita- 
tion is a first step on the arduous road leading to the restora- 
tion of political institutions that are capable of nurturing repre- 
sentative democracy, democratic citizenship and the ennobling 
art of self-government."'" If Congress is truly a representa- 
tive body which is responsive to the people, then it should pro- 
pose an amendment to the Constitution limiting congressional 
terms and present it to the people for ratification. Congress' 
refusal to  do so is the best evidence that it is not the represen- 
tative body that the Framers of the Constitution envisioned, 
103. Id. at 359. 
104. Id. 
105. BANCROFT, supra note 33, at 294. 
106. Id. at 294-95. 
107. Petracca, supm note 66, at A30. 
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thus giving credence to the argument that the Framers would 
support today's state-imposed congressional term limitations. It 
is a sad fact that if the states are not allowed to impose con- 
gressional term limits, Congress never will, in spite of the will 
of the peop le the  supposed ultimate source of power. 
Dwayne A. Vance 
